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"Lou, Liang-Ownership Structure and Ef6ciency: An Incentive Mechanism Ap-
proach
We comparc etficiency implications of two team production models involving
problems of tcam moral hazard and adverse selection. The models. formalized in a
generalized principal Jmultiplc-agent framework, differ only in the underlyingowner-
ship structures, one characterized by absentee ownership, the o[her by cooperative
ownership. Explicit comparison ol'optimal contractual solutions suggesu that, even if
a hrm is viewed as a nexus ofcomplete contracts, the ownership structure of the firm
matters for its economic efficiency. In this context, the cooperatíve firm can achieve
first-best production efficiency, whereas the absentee-owner's firm cannot. Related
issues are discussed throughout the paper. J. Contp. Lc'nnunt.. September 1992.
I6( 3), pp. 399-431. University of Limburg. 6200 MD Maastricht. The
Netherlands. ~; I49: 4cadcm~c Press. Inc.
Jotrrnu! uJ Ecun~~ntic Litrrulurc Classification Numbers: D23. D82. 154.
1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we reconsider a frequently asked question: "Given a firm that
is viewed as a nexus of contracts, does the location of ownership have any
' This paper grew from a chapter of my doctoral thesis written at CORE J(AG. University of
Louvain-la-Neuve, and revised at CentER, Tilburg University, and at the University of Lim-
burg. I am deeply grateful to Claude d'Aspremont and Maurice Marchand for their excellent
supervision of mv research- and to two anonymous referees of this Journal for very helpful
comments and suggestions. Although the opinion and remaining errors are my own, f also thank
Svend Alba'k. Vicky Barham, Josef C. Brada, Eric van Damme. Mathias Dewatripont.
Fransoise Forges. Roger Guesnerie, Jean Fran~ois Mertens. seminar patticipants at CentER.
Tilburg University, University of Graz. University of Wien, the óth World Congress of the
Econometric Society in Barcelona. and the Sth Annual Congress ofEuropean Economic Associ-
ation in Lisbon for helpful suggestions and discussions. Financial supports from ABOS and
from CentER are also gratefully acknowledged.
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impact on its economic efficiency?" A prevailing answer to this question,
which we call the irrelevance hypothesis, is that insofaras the firm can be
described as a comprehensive contract, where every contingency is thought
of and built into the contract, ownership is irrelevant to the issue of effi-
ciency. Location ofownership rights can only matter when it is impossible to
write up such a comprehensive contract at the first date ( see, e.g., Hart, 1988:
Tirole, 1988). This observation explains the vast variety of extant ap-
proaches addressing issues of ownership and efliciency, which all mark a
departure in one way or another from the complete and comprehensive
contract. These include the incomplete contract approach ( e.g., Grossman
and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1988; Milgrom and Roberts, 1989 ), the
behavioral approach (e.g.. the references in Jensen and Meckling. 1979,
footnote 6; the overview in Bonin and Putterman, 1987, pp. 5-8; Mcleod.
1987), the budget-breaking approach (e.g., Holmstrbm, 1982; Macleod,
1988 ), and the fixed-form contract approach ( e.g.. Sen, 1966; Alchian and
Demsetz, 1972; Stiglitz, 1974; Putterman and Skillman, 1988 ).'-
However, the irrelevance hypothesis begs the important question of whv
the bargaining parties necessarily always arrive at the same level of produc-
tion etFiciency in comprehensive contracts irrespective of the underlying
ownership structure, provided that the cuntracts are Pareto efficient. It might
be because the issues of ownership and the survival of organizational forms
have been primarily discussed in moral hazard situations where all the par-
ties possess s.vmrt~c~ericul information when contracts are signed (e.g., Hart
and Holmstrám, 1987; Holmstrám and Tirole, 1987 ).' Ifthis is the case. the
irrelevance hypothesis can be justified in a Coasian perspective by taking
into account an e.~ urtte market for contracts that are most efficient.
Indeed. if there exist precontractual informational asymmetries. this hy-
pothesis no longer holds.4 For example, consider a principal-agent relation-
ship with adverse selection. It is well known that the second-best incentive
mechanisms designed by the principal, the owner, under adverse selection
do not lead to efficient resource allocation except in trivial cases (e.g.. Baron
and Myerson, 198?: Guesnerie and Laffont, 1984). Here, should the agent
be vested with ownership, i.e., the exclusive authority to decide the sharing
rules subject to the principal breaking even, first-best resource allocation can
in most cases be achieved. Ofcourse, this would mean that it makes no sense
- Here we refer to contracts that are subject to some specific functional structures, such as
constant wage contracts, sharecropping, equal profit sharing, etc. ,4lchian and Demsetz ( 197? )
focus on the owner's monitoring role in a presumed context with fixed-form contracts.
' That is. when the contracts are e~ unte Pareto etitcient, in the terminolog~ of Holmstrbm
and Myerson ( 1983).
'(n this case, the contracts are inrerim Pareto efficient in the terminology of Holmstrbm and
Myerson ( 1983 ).
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to have a principal. A fundamental reason for separation of ownership and
managemcnt is perhaps precisely thal agents are not wealthy enough to own
all their activitics.s However, as the number of agents increases. it becomes
more feasible that the agents can pool their financial resources and jointly
own the firm.
[n thc light of the above discussion, we conclude that if ownership and
efficiency were to be sensibly analyzed in a complete contracting framework,
the models would have to take into account asymmetric information prior to
the contracting date and include a group of agents who are able to own the
firm. [n fact, the existence of contracting parties possessing precontractural
private information is not an unreasonable assumption. An individual cer-
tainly knows better than do others his own past history, his potential ability
for the job, risk propensity, minimum reserve wage or utility, natural inclina-
tion for his professíon, preference for hard work, etc., and all these factors
can influence the othe.r contracting individuals' utility or welfare.
This motivates us to formalize our firm in terms of a principal~multiple-
agcnt relationship in the scnse of Myerson ( 198? ), where the agents who
engage in team production, in the sense of Alchian and Demsetz ( 197? ).
possess private information concerning their own productivity and make
private efforts ihai are not observable. Inevitably, this attempt leads us into
some analytical intricacies, but recent developments in principal-agent
theorv offer readv tools for a tractable analvsis.
In our context, ownership is understood as the right to set up rules con-
cerning the distribution ofearnings. Implicit in this view is the identification
of the owner with the right to claim as much profit as possible. subject to
legal restrictions, informational constraints. costs of decision making. and
bargaining power of the contracting parties.b
S Other reasons include vocational specialization for ihe agents and risk di~ersitication for the
i n vestors.
6 Indeed, the concept of ownership or property rights is always in ~cant of a good definition.
Traditional legal definitions of ownership have been either too specihc or too ~ague to be useful
for developing pcnetrating insights into the survival of ownership structures. Recently. Gross-
man and Hart ( 1986 ) propose that ownership be defincd as the purchase of the residual control
rights over the physical assets that are left uncontracted for beforehand. llilgrom and Roberts
( 1989 ) point out that this definition would be problematic in its application, and suggest the
alternative view that the owner is the one who collects residual returns rather than residual
control. Traditional ptincipal-agent models usually simply do not distinguish bet~veen the
owner. the principaL the residual claimant, or the one who designs the profit-sharing rules. On
the one hand. our conception ofownership recognizes the possible separation between owner-
ship and the residual-profit claimancy. On the other hand. ít extends the definition ofGrossman
and Han in the following sense. At the start of a relationship. when no contracts have been
signed beforehand. the residual control rights are nothing but the total control rights regarding
the assets. including both tangible and intangible assets. to be used or disposed. which necessar-
ily include the control right to design the incentive mechanisms concerning thr sharing of future
ao, trlnvc zou
Our major purpose in this paper is to compare the efficiency implicatíons
of two polar ownership structures, wherein the firm is viewed as a complete
nexus of contracts. The first structure, called the absentee ownership, is for-
malized as a standard principal-agent model in which the residual claimant,
the principal, is the absentee owner who designs the incentive mechanism to
maximize his profit. The second structure, called the cooperative ownership,
is formalízed as a variation of the principal-agent models in which the agents
are the collective owners of the firm who collectively design the incentive
mechanism that maximizes the joint profits of the firm.' In order to compare
their efficiency implications, we construct the two models in such a way that
they differ only in the underlying ownership structures. In particular, we
assume the same rational beliefs and behavior of all the contracting parties
irrespective of the underlying ownership structures.
An interesting observation is that under cooperative ownership, the opti-
mal incentive mechanism can be first-best in that it eliminates all problems
of adverse selection and moral hazard. This result may be perceived as an
extension of the standard collective choice results (e.g., d'Aspremont and
Gérard-Varet, 1979) to a situation in which the decision rules depend not
only on each individual agent's hidden information, but also on his hidden
action. ln contrast, under absentee ownership, the optimal incentive mecha-
nism is only second-best. This result suggests that potential advantages of
cooperative ownership may not necessarily be limited to the philosophical,
behavioral, or social aspects of life (see Bonin and Putterman, 1987 j but
may also be extended to the institutional aspect where potentially efficient
incentive structures are feasible ( see Estrin, 1991, for a similar, though un-
formalized, argument).
[mportant assumptions behind this rather strong result are (a) all the
agents and investors are risk neutral, ( b) there is a costless access to the
external financial and insurance markets for both types ofthe hrms, and ( c)
there are substantial profits to be shared. We discuss these assumptions ~vhen
thev are introduced.
The models are introduced in the next section, together with the defini-
tions of incentive-compatible mechanisms and the concepts of equilibrium-
solutions. In Section 3 we characterize the optimal incentive mechanisms
under the two ownership structures. The proofs are relegated to the Appen-
dix. In Section 4 we discuss the results and related issues. Section 5 concludes
the paper.
cash flows that will be generated from the use of these assets. In Sectiun 3~tie show that. at least
theoretically. the claimant of residual returns may not exhibit thc proper íncentive of an owner
as we would expect.
' In the present context, this objective is equivalent to maximizing an equallc weighred sum of
all the agents' utilities.
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2. THE MODEL
2.1. Thc~ Seurp
Suppose a firm is to be formed where n agents and a residual claimant are
to undertake a profitable actívity.g Each agent, indexed i E N- j I, . .., n},
supplies unobservable efiort e' E A-[0, l3J with a private nonmonetary cost
or disutility V`: ( c~`, 6') E A x 6' ~ V`( e', B`) E R, where e` E 9` - [Q`, B`] is
a private efficiency parameter, known as the ith agent's type.
The agents are best thought of as specialized managers and workers, and
we assume that none of them is dispensable.9 Note that the type variables 9'
are not really necessary if we only want to model heterogeneous utilities
between the agents, since we already allow the disutility functions T'" to vary
across the index i. The type variables serve to introduce the information
asymmetries in the model. One way of introducing asymmetric information
might be to simply assume that the functional form V`( -) is only known by
agent i himself, but this would render an unnecessary degree ofcomplication
to the problem. Instead, following the traditional adverse-selection litera-
ture, we assume that the form ii'( -) is public knowledge and we let the
disutility of effort be parameterized by a private information parameter,
notably B` for all i E N. In this way the index i can be used to distinguish the
observable differences among the agents, e.g., i- 1 represents a financial
manager, i - 2 a marketing manager, i - n a driver, etc. Further, each agent i
can be viewed as chosen from a population of types B'. As such B' might be
interpreted as either a measure of private cost efficiency for agent i or his
private preference for effort.
Assume 1-'é ~ 0(effort is costly), VéP ~ 0(effort also increases the mar-
ginal cost), Y'B ~ 0( higher type implies lower cost), and V~ ~ 0( higher type
also implies lower marginal cost).'o Assume also that it is common belief
that the agents' possible types are independently distributed and that their
cumulative distribution and density functions are given by F'( .) andf'( -)
on6'[f'(.)~Oon6']. Lete-(e',...,e")andB-(B',...,8").The
agents' effort, together with some technology or assets. determine a mone-
tary output. Let .t: e E.A" -~ x(e) E R denote the output net of the costs of
technology. We assume that x( -) is concave on A", strictly increasing in
each argument, and twice continuously differentiable. In order to focus on
effort allocations we assume that the technology requires a lump sum mone-
tary investment and is normalized to zero. In the first model, the technology
e The residual claimant can be a group ofclaimants who act as a single legal person.
9 It is plausible that standardized and~or dispensable jobs involve less problems of incentives.
hence they are abstracted away.
'o When there is no ambiguity, we drop out the superscript of variables, e.g., the partial
derivative of i'' w.r.t. 9' is written 6"; instead of I'é„ etc.
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is exclusively owned by the residual claimant, called the principal; in the
second model by the agents equally."
Let OP denote the principal-owner's firm or absentee ownership. OP can,
in general, be interpreted as an organization that is characterized by the
separation of ownership and management. Note that it may describe not
only a classical capitalistic firm the owners of which are the shareholders, but
also a state-owned enterprise so far as the objective ofthe firm is to maximize
the expected profits net of wages.12
Let Oa denote the firm where the agents are the exclusive collective
owners, thus cooperative ownership. Ownership forms nearest to Oa are
partnerships, co-ops, labor-managed firms, etc. But it is worth noting that
unlike most co-op models, in our cooperative the collective owners are al-
lowed to interact with nonowner residual claimants.13
The essential problem is to see how the profits are to be shared by the
agents and the residual claimant. We view this problem as the owner(s)
designing the optimal incentive mechanisms or sharing rules under feasibil-
ity constraints. Let S` denote the share of profits that goes to the ith agent,
whose preference functions are assumed to be additively separable in money
and effort and linear in money. The ith agent's utility thus is a`( S', e', 8' )-
S` - V'( e`, B'). The profit net of payments to the agents, i.e., W-.r -~; S',
goes to the residual claimant. All the agents and the residual claimant are
assumed to be risk neutral and expected-utility maximizers.
?.?. Incentive-Compatible Mechanisrns and Equilibrium Strruegies
It bears repeating that the timing ofcontracts is important for our analysis.
As mentioned in the Introduction, if contracting takes place before the
agents' types are realized, ownership is an irrelevant issue. In the present
context, we suppose that each agent has already been informed of his effi-
ciency parameter prior to the contracting date. Thus the sharing rules have to
be designed under incomplete information.
In general, the problem of incentive mechanism design is to characterize
the interirn Pareto-efi'icient decision ru]es ( Holmstr6m and Myerson,
" Equal sharing ofownership is a simplifying assumption. It avoids complicating the consider-
ations in formalizing the cooperativé s objective function. See Footnote IZ.
'Z The case of mixed ownership with different parties such as absentee investers, managers,
and workers holding different proportions ofownership shares is certainly an interesting subject
that deserves being listed on the future research agenda.
" In a pure team-moral-hazard context, the ability to interact with outside residual-profit
claimants has been considered by Holmstrdm ( 1982 ) as a distinguishing characteristic between
the cooperative and the capitalist firms, with the former deprived of the access to the external
financial and insurance markets. When we suppress this distinction, ownership becomes an
irrelavent issue for efficiency in Holmstróm's context because of the absence of precontractual
asvmmetric information.
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I 983 ), that is, the rules that are incentive-feasible and incentive-compatible
in the face of precontractual private information. Notably, interim Pareto
efficiency is only a necessary condition for all the sensible sharing rules that
could possibly be designed by the players via any sort ofcommunication and
bargaining. There is still a problem as to which particular rule should be
selected on the Pareto frontier. In the case where a single individual, the
principal, designs the contracts, this is hardly an issue, but in the cooperative
case, where the agents are all entitled to participate in setting up the sharing
rules, the matter becomes much complicated. Indeed, although we assume
that the cooperative members act noncooperatively in revealing their private
information and in choosing their effort levels, there is a cooperative game
with incomplete information in the first place that they must ptay as to
which particular incentive mechanism on the Pareto frontier they should
collectively choose.'" In this paper, however, we are only interested in show-
ing the existence of a particular set of Pareto-efficient rules that are consis-
tent with the objective of utility as well as profit maximization, and that can
achieve first-best production efficiency under the cooperative ownership
structure. Thus the remaining problem boils down to a separate judgment of
the cooperative's objectives ( see the next subsection ).
According to the revelation principle (Myerson, 1982; Forges, 1986),
there is no loss of generality to consider mechanisms of the form (S, e) -
[(S',e'),...,(S",e")j,whereS':(x,B)ERxA~S`(x,B)ERisthe
share of profits to the ith agent, called the incentive contract, and e`: B E
e~ e'(B) E R is the effort level recommended to the ith agent, called the
effort recommendation.
An incentive mechanism determines an internal rule of the game. The
game proceeds as follows. The owner( s) hrst commit(s) to a mechanism (S,
e). Then each agent announces a type 8' E 6` to the public.15 After the
announcement, a specific incentive contract plus effort recommendation is
determined, according to the mechanism, for each agent. Then, each agent
makes some private effort and receives a share of profits according to the
contract when the output .r is realízed.
In order to focus on the institutional effect ofownership structures, we use
the same solution concept to characterize the agents' strategies. Irrespective
of the ownership forms, we assume that the agents act noncooperatively in
reporting private types and choosing their effort levels, and in forming their
" See Myerson ( 1984 ) for ihe formalization of a general structure of cooperative games with
incomplete information.
15 Strictly, the revelation principle applies only to the communication environment where the
agents communicate separately and confidentially with the principal or via a mediator. But in
the present context there is no loss ofgenerality to limit our attention to the public communica-
tion environment, whereas doing so allows us to derive the opiimal mechanisms more intu-
itively, For a more detailed discussion see Zou ( 1989 ).
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beliefs about the other agents' strategies and beliefs. That is, each agent is
concerned only about maximizing his own expected utility, even if it were to
be achieved at the expense of the other agents' welfare or ofthe organization
as a whole. Such an undiscriminating formalization of individual behavior
under different ownership structures may have a tendency to overemphasize
self-interested behavior for the cooperative, but we show that judiciously
designed incentive mechanisms do exist that establish economic efficiency
for such cooperatives.
Recently, MacLeod ( 1987 ) has proposed a behavioral distinction between
cooperative and noncooperative organizations. He argues that " the Nash
equilibrium concept is most appropriate when modeling a cooperative firm
subject to incentive constraints, while the notion of dominant strategy im-
plementation better models noncooperative organizations." Under this dis-
tinction, cooperative ownership is shown to achieve higher efficiency than
noncooperative ownership. Since any dominant strategy equilibrium is a
Nash equilibrium (e.g., Dasgupta et al., 1979), the above behavioral distinc-
tion implies weaker incentive constraints for the cooperatives, whence the
dominance of cooperatives over noncooperative organizations. Intuitively.
if we adopt MacLeod's view and extend this behavioral distinction to our
context, the inefficiency of the absentee ownership would become, at least
weakly, more severe.
Given an incentive mechanism (S, e), each agent's strategy is a pair of
functions B': 9' H 6` and ê': e x 6' H.9 such that the ith agent having type
H` would choose to report H'(H`) and choose effort level ~~'( U, H`) when H is the
vector of reported types.
The solution concept that we use is an adaptation of the notion of 13u~~e-
sian Incentit~e Computibilitv proposed by d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet
( 1979) to the present Bayesian game setting with both private types and
effort. Let H denote the vector of true types of the agents and let an incentive
mechanism ( S, e) be given. Write e-' - ( c~' , . , e'-~ , e` `~ . . . . , e" ). H-` -
( H' ,..., H'-' , U'}' .. ., U"). After the stage ofcommunication, suppose that
agent i has reported B', and he expects that the other agents have reported
their types truthfully and will follow the effort recommendation, his effort
strategy should satisfy
c~'(B', H) E arg max [S'(x(e', e-'(H', H-')), (~`. H-')) - 6"(e`, H')],
~~
where we use ê`(B`, U) to denote ê`[(B', B-'), U'].
DEr-INtTtoN. An incentive mechanism [S( .), e( .)] is ( Bayesian) incen-
tive cornpatible ~citlt public commt~nicatlon ( abbreviated to ICP ) if and only
if it satisfies the following conditions: for all H` E 6' and i E N.
H' E arg max E9-,
é~
x[S~(.v(e~(è~, U), e-r(H', H-')), (U`, H-`)) - i"(ê'(H'. H). H')]. ( 1)
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andforallFlEHandiEN,
e'(il) - ë'(B', t7) E arg max [S'(.Y(c'`, ~-'(e)), B) - V'(e', B')l, (2)~~
where E9 ( EB-,) is the expectation operator over e(A`6' ).
By ( l), given that all the other agents report their true types and follow the
recommended effort levels, no agent wants to misreport his type in the com-
munication stage. By (2), given that all the agents have reported their types
honestly and all the other agents would choose the recommended effort
levels, no agent can gain from not choosing his recommended effort level.
Thus, the conditions ( 1) and (? ) characterize a particular commttnication
equilibrittm ( CE ), ( Forges, 1986; Myerson, 1986 ). We call such an equilib-
rium a puhlic commttnication equilihritrm (PCE). By the revelation princi-
ple there is no loss ofgenerality to restrict attention to the set ofCE ( Forges,
1986) and in the present context, to that of PCE or ICP mechanisms
( Zou, 1989 ).
A CE in the sense of Myerson and Forges relies on an uninformed media-
tor who communicates separately and confidentially with each agent. The
revelation principle says that any arbitrary equilibrium strategies that are
achievable via any sort of communication among the agents can also be
implemented in an incentive-compatible mechanism in which all the agents
report their private types honestly and follow the effort recommendation of
the mediator. The difference between our PCE and the CE is that, after the
phase of communication, in a CE an agent does not necessarily know the
types that have been reported and the effort levels that will be chosen by the
other agents, whereas, in a PCE he does know.
The reason for us to choose the PCE as a solution concept is twofold. First,
as suggested in most cooperative or labor-management literature, decision
making in a cooperative organization is a participatory and democratic pro-
cess. Each member should be allowed to participate in setting up the profit-
sharing rules, and it is most natural that discussions are made in public.1ó
Secondly, the PCE is a more restrictive concept than that of CE. That is, the
set of the former equilibria is contained, often strictly, in that of the latter.
Thus, the problem of multiple equilibría might tend to be less serious in
adopting the PCE concept."
Voluntary participation gives each agent the opportunity to require a min-
imal expected utility level, which we normalize to zero. at the start.'g Under
16 In fact this reasoning might also apply to most principal-owned firms since it is implausible
that the principal, just by being the owner, is able to control all means ofcommunication.
" For more discussion on the problems of multiple equilibria, see Demski and Sappington
( 198~1). Demski et al. ( 1988 ), Ma et aL ( 1988 ), Patfrey ( 1991 ), and Zou ( 1991 ).
" If the initial investment has not been normalized to zero. we can allow each agent to require
at least his share of the investment in the cooperative case.
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the assumption that none of the agents is dispensable and assuming that the
outpuf is high enough to justify team production for all possible types, the
following individual rationality constraints should be taken into account:
~(O ) d~r
~,a-~[S'(r(c(~)), 8) - V'(r''(B), B')] ~ 0, 'd9' E 6', i E N,(3)
where ~r'(0') is the ith agent's optimal expected utility given an ICP mecha-
nism (S(B), e(8)).
?.3. Objective oflhe Fiim
In OP, the principal's objective is to maximize the expected profits net of
the payments to the agents, subject to the incentive and the individual ratio-
nalitv constraints. That is.
PP:
max Eo[.v(c~(fl)) - ~ S~(x(e(H)). el
.s. P ;
(4)
subject to ( 1), ( 2), and ( 3). This formulation captures the capitalistic nature
of the absentee ownership; the owners do not make direct labor inputs and
design the sharing rules that can best extract returns on their capital assets.
In Oa, there is no consensus on what should be the best specificatíon of the
objectives of a cooperative organization. Admittedly, the organizational goal
of a cooperative may be influenced by its members' relative bargaining
power, its internal organizational ideology, convention, consensus politics,
and various other particulars. Given this variety, it is natural that there is no
single and unanimously accepted formal definition of the cooperative's ob-
jectives. However, dividend maximization and utility maximization are the
two most representative specifications of the cooperative's objectives in the
labor-management literature. In the former definition, see. e.g., Bonin and
Putterman ( 1987 ) and their references, cooperative members are assumed
to maximize the firm's profits net of capital and labor costs. in the form of
dividends that they share equally. In the latter dehnition the cooperative's
goal is to maximize a typical member's utility ( Miyazaki, 1984; and Tapiero.
1989). This definition is based on the assumption that all the cooperative
members are identical.
In the present context, while suppressing the presumption that profits
must be shared equally, we adapt the first definition, modified as profit
maximization, as our cooperative's objective. Although income-equality has
been traditionally considered as a distinct feature for labor-managed firms, it
imposes an obvious constraint in designing the optimal institutional struc-
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tures.19 The disincentive effect of equal profit-sharing becomes most acute
when the organizational members possess private information and make
private decisions, as in the present context. Since the costs of labor input, or
the disutility ofeffort, are not publicly observable, the actually realized profit
level, defined as the revenue net of capital and labor costs, necessarily de-
pends on the agents honestly reporting their true costs. But if profits were to
be shared equally, every agent would have an incentive to exaggerate his true
cost and to make as little effort as possible. Above all, as mentioned in the
Introduction, our ultimate goal here is not a positive description of bona fide
cooperative 6rms, but to show, at least in theory, that the cooperative owner-
ship structure implies feasible institutional arrangement that achieves pro-
duction and allocational efficiency.
There are three major reasons for us to choose the profit-maximization
definition. First, assuming profit maximization brings the cooperative's ob-
jective closely in line with that ofthe absentee-owner's firm. This allows us to
highlight the essential cause for different efficiency results under different
ownership structures. Second, since our agents are different in quality and in
preference for effort, there is a problem of choosing the right utility function
in the utility-maximization approach. A plausible choice is to give every
agent an equal weight and assume that a typical agent's utility, or an average
utility, is the sum of all the agents' utilities devided by the number of the
agents. If this average utility is to be maximized, it is equivalent to maximiz-
ing simply the sum of all the agents' utilities. Nevertheless, the question
would still be left unanswered why different agents should be given the same
weight. The third reason is more of an observation. While profit maximiza-
tion and utility maximization are distinct in interpretations, they may lead
to the same problem formulation and hence the same ana]ytical results,
specially when the agents are assumed income risk neutral. As shown below,
this happens to be true in our model, in which the expected budget-balancing
condition establishes an equivalence relationship between profit maximiza-
tion and maximization of the sum of the agents' utilities.
The expected budget-balancing condition is formally de6ned as
Eq[,r(e(B)) - ~ S'(.r(e(B)), B)J - 0. (5)
Note that here we use a less restrictive condition, i.e., we require that the
cooperative's budget only to be balanced e.~ ante. This relaxation is crucial
for deriving an efficiency result for the cooperatives. To understand this
condition, it might be helpful to think alternatively of a closed cooperative
" In a moral hazar context where weaker conditions such as "envv-freè' and "fairness" are
used to define equity. Macleod ( 1988) shows that efficient allocations can be achieved in the
coopera[ives.
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firm that has no interactions with the outside financial world. Then, the
jointly realized output must always be shared among the agents or else it
would be impossible to account for a shortage or excess of the payments.
This implies a more conventional er post budget-balancing constraint:
r(e) -~ S'(x(e), B) - 0, de E A", b'B E 6. (6)
,
As is shown by Holmstrám (1982), under the ex post budget-balancing
condition a first-best solution will not be attained even if there are no infor-
mational asymmetries among the agents.20 This suggests that the cooperative
members can be better off if, as we assume here, they can find a residual
claimant to help them break the ex post budget constraint. On the other
hand, in order to avoid expected shortage or excess of payments, it is still
necessary to consider an expected or e.~ unte budget-balancing condition,
which is given by ( 5). Thus, perhaps more to the point, condition ( 5) could
also be called a budget-breaking condition. We would argue in the present
context that it is not unreasonable to allow the cooperatives to have resort to
outside risk-neutral investors in resolving their budget balancing problems.
We show later that typical moral hazard problems associated with outside
financing, e.g., Jensen and Meckling ( 1976, 1979 ), do not occur in our
model.
The cooperative's problem can now be stated as
P'
max Eo(-v(~(B)) - ~ ~`(c'(~). 8')) (7)
s. ~ i
subject to ( 1), ( 2), ( 3), and ( 5). Note that substituting the budget balancing
condition ( S) into the objective function ( 7) yields an equivalent utility-
maximizing objective
max En ~ [S`(-r(~(B)), ~) - v'(~''(B), ~')]a (8)
S,e i
This shows that profit maximization is equivalent to maximizing the sum of
all the agents' utilities, giving each agent the same weight. Deviding this sum
by N would give us another equivalent expression that can be interpreted as
'-a To be more precise. Holmstróm shows that the e~ pnsi budget-balancing constraint pre-
cludes cooperatives from achieving efficiency when all the agents are risk neutraL [f agents are
risk averse, Rasmusen ( 1987 ) shows that efficient budget-balancing contracts may exist. These
contracts can take the form ofa random scapegoat contract, in which one agent is chosen to be
penalized when output is low, or ofa random massacre contract. in which oneagent receives the
entire output and the rest are penalized. The budget-balancing conditions have been extensively
discussed in the collective choice literature. For example. see Groves and Ledyard ( 1977 ), and
d'.Aspremont and Gérard-Varet ( 1979 ).
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND EFFICIENCY 411
the maximization ofa typical agent's utility. Obviously, ifall the agents were
identical, we would go back to the traditional utility-maximization defini-
tion of the cooperatives' objectives.
It is clear that both models involve problems of team moral hazard (see
Holmstrdm, 1982) and adverse selection. Moral hazard stems from the un-
observability of effort, which gives each agent the opportunity to reduce
effort while not bearing the full consequence of the reduced output. Adverse
selection stems from the uncertainty ofeach agent's type, which enables the
agents to enjoy some information rents, as will be clear later. The next sec-
tion is devoted to solving problems Po and P'.
3. OPTIMAL INCENTIVE MECHANISMS
3.1. First-Best Solution
Before we proceed, it is useful to see what solution one could obtain under
complete and perfect information, i.e., when the realization of B is common
knowledge and when all the agents' effort levels are publicly observable. This
will serve as a benchmark for our subsequent comparative analysis.
DeFtNITtoN. A mechanism ( S, e): 9yR" x A" is first-best if it solves the
following problem for all 6 E 6:
Pr:




[S`( x(~'(e)), 0) - ti"(~`(B), B')l - 0- di E N. ( 10)
If an interior solution to P f exists for all 9 E Ej, the optimal solution,
denoted ( Sj( 8), ef ( B)), should satisfy the first-order condition when each
agent chooses the effort level that equates his marginal cost of effort with the
marginal expected output, i.e.,
.ve,(c'f(e))-VP(ef`(8),B')-0, b'BE6.iE1~', (11)
and the individual rationality condition when the expected profit share to
each agent is higher than his cost:
Sf'(x(ef ( 8)), 9) - V'(eJ~(6), 9`), `de E 6, i E N. (12)
In order for our analysis to make sense, and for ease of derivations of the
optimai solutions, we make some assumptions on the preference and distri-
bution functions.
A1. ForallBE6andiEN,
(i) L"é(0}, d`) - 0 and Vé(B-, H') - x:
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(ii) For eI(U) satisfying ( 1 l), x(ef(0)) ~ E;~ V'(eI'(B), B').
A2. For all B' E 6` and i E N, k"(8') ~ 1, where k`(B') -(1 - F'(B'))~
l~'(o').
A3. ForallB'E9`,eE[O,B],andiEN, V~~~Oand V~B~O.
In assumption A1 the simbols 0} and B- denote the limits as effort e'
approaches 0 from the right and B from the left, respectively; the simbol "~"
means "be sufficiently larger." Intuitively, A 1( i) says that the agents' mar-
ginal cost of effort is negligible when the effort level is sufficiently low, and is
prohibitively high when the effort level is close to their upper limit of capac-
ity. Think, e.g., of effort as a measure of intensity or hours per day of work.
A 1( ii ) is a simplifying assumption, which says that, for all types of agents,
team production is justified in that, under the optimal effort allocation, there
is substantial amount of pro6ts to be created.21 This assumption is actually
not necessary for our comparative results, though it helps ensure a first-best
solution for the cooperatives.
A2 is a technical assumption, commonly called the hazard rate condition.
lt is widely used in solving adverse selection problems and the design of
auctions. Although it is difficult to find straightforward interpretations for
this assumption, a class ofinteresting distributions do meet this requirement.
including the uniform distribution.22 Again, this assumption is not necessary
for deriving optimal solutions, although a more fastidious analysis would be
inevitible without it.z3
We have assumed earlier that V~ ~ 0, which means that for one unit
increase in the level of effort the more efficient agent requires a smaller
increase in compensation to maintain the same utility level than the less
efficient agent. The first part of assumption A3 says that such differences
between more and less efticient agents tend to be more significant as the level
of effort grows larger. This seems to be plausible because, intuitively, it
should be in fulhlling the more challenging tasks that the differences in
ability are more easily revealed. The second part of A3 means that the above
difference between more and less efficient agents tends to be less significant
`' According to Alchian and Demsetz ( 1972 ), team production is justified when several types
of private resources, such as effort. are used, each provided by a different agent, and the joint
output is greater than the sum of separable outputs of each cooperating agent's resource input.
'-'- See McAfee and McMillan ( 1987) for a statistic interpretation of k'(B'). Sometimes a
stronger monotone hazard ratecondition isadopted, written as d( Í'(B`)~( I- F'(B'))]~d0' , 0
(e.g., Wilson, 1983). Using a linear transformation of types: t' - N' t N' - B', the monotone
hazardrateconditioncanalsobewrittenasd(G'(t')~;'(t')]~dt`,O.whereG(t')- 1 -F`(9't
B' - t' ) and g'( t' )- G"( t`). See Baron and Besanko ( 1984 ) for more e~amples of the distribu-
tions meeting this condition.
'-' For an impression. see Baron and Myerson ( 1982) and Maskin and Riley ( 1984). They
derive optimal solutions under pure adverse selection in a single-agent context without this
hazard rate condition.
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as the efficiency parameter grows large. Perhaps it is easiest to think of B' as
the amount of past personal investment in abi(ity, through education, for
example, and then V~ , 0 could be interpreted as some sort ofdiminishing
rate of return in this investment. Thus this assumption seems also rea-
sonable.
3.2. Optirna! Incentive Mechanisrn under Absentee-Ownership
We first present the proposition, then discuss the result.
PROPOStTtoN 1. Under A 1-A3, thc~re exists an optirna! solt~tion to P":
(SP(x, B), eP(B)) -[(SP'(x, B). ep'(B)), ...,(SP"(x. B), eo"(B))]. It satis-
fies eP(B) - é(B) and
SP'(x, B) - S`(B) f D`(B)~Y --Y(e(B))l, ( 13)
tt~here D'( B)- V e( é`( B), B' ))~rP,( é( B)) and (S( B), é( B)) satisfies tl:atfor all
BE6ancliEN,
-~Q.tE'(B)) - ~~(e'(B), B~) -~ k'(B`)~~(~''(B), e~) - o, (la)
S~(B) - ~r'(B') -I- v'(c;''(B), B`) ( ls)
ir'(B') -- fo f V é(c;''(B), B`) dF-'(ë-`) d8, ( 16)
J B, J e-.
~rhere 6-' - 6`6' and dF-'(B-`) - rj,~; dF~(B~).
Proof. See the Appendix.24
From ( 13 ) we can see that the incentive contract for each agent is a linear
function ofx, the slope ofwhich is given by D'( B). In the equilibrium where
all the agents report honestly their private information B and choose the
recommended effort levels é , the payment to agent i is S`( B), and the utility
ofagent i is ïr`(B'). Ifeffort were contractable, the payment-effort vectorpair
( S( B), é( B )) would represent an incentive-compatible mechanism with pure
adverse selection. The proposition is thus an extension of the observation in
single-agent settings that with risk-neutral agents, the principal can costlessly
ímpliment a pure adverse selection solution, i.e., eliminate completely the
z' This proposition is based on a more general result in Zou ( 1989 ). In preparing the last
revision of this paper. 1 came across two other independent articles that present similar results to
this proposition, namely Picard and Rey ( 1990 ) and McAfee and McMillan ( 199 I). We will not
discuss in detail the simílarities and difïerences of our result as compared to these authors',
except for two brief remarks. Whereas their models are formalized in an implementation frame-
work, we formulate the problems in terms of the notion of PCE. Also, while these authors focus
more on the analytical aspects of the problems, our central theme here is to compare efficiency
implications of the optimal institutions under different ownership structures.
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problem of moral hazard, even when effort ïs not observable (e.g., Laffont
and Tirole, 1986; Picard, 1987; Guesnerie et al., 1989; and Zou, 1992).
We also see from ( I6 ) that the agents, except for those whose types are the
lowest, enjoy a strictly positive utility level. This amount is commonly per-
ceived as the agent's information rents. Following the convention, we call
(SP, ep) the second-best incentive mechanism. It is second best because the
principal cannot extract all the agents' information rents as he can under
complete information, and because the agents do not provide the socially
most efficient effort levels in this incentive mechanism.
That separation of ownership and management would result in ineffi-
ciency is not at all á new observation (e.g., see the celebrated book of Berle
and Means, 1932). Explicit recognition ofconflicting interests and informa-
tional asymmetries between the principal and the agents allows one to assert
that inefficiency is almost a rule rather than exception in modern corpora-
tions. The source of inefficiency is best seen from equation ( 14 ), which is a
familiar characterization oF solutions dealing with pure adverse selection
problems (e.g., Baron and Myerson, 1982; Guesnerie and Laffont, 1984).
Comparing it with the characterization of the first-best solution ( 1 I), we
find an extra term k`V~ in ( 14). This term might be loosely interpreted as
some sort of extra marginal cost for the principal to induce agent i, who has
0', to increase effort, owing to the incentive compatibility constraint ( 1).~5
The conflict of interests between the principal and the agents probably is the
most serious bamer that prevents a firm under absentee ownership from
achieving economic efficiency. With the principal trying to maximize the
residual profit on the one side and the agents trying to secure their informa-
tion rents on the other, the best solution the contracting parties can achieve is
shown to be an expensive compromise. We will have more insight into the
source of inefficiency after deriving the solution to the cooperative's
problem.
Before we proceed, it is interesting to have a look at a special case where all
the agents' types are public knowledge. The optimal solution can be deri~~ed
by simply taking the limit as B` -~ B' for all i E N in ( l4) and ( 16). This
would yield a first-best solution since k'(B`) ín ( 14) would degenerate to
zero. Moreover, each agent's profit would also shrink to zero according to
( 16). Eliminating the adverse selection problem this way, our model boils
down to the pure team-moral-hazard model of Holmstrdm ( 1982 ). The
difference is that we derive an efficient effort allocation using linear incentive
contracts, whereas Holmstrám chooses step functions. The existence ofsuch
variety of ways to restore efficiency with a principal breaking the budget
constraint for the team has already been noted by Holmstrám ( 1982 ).
ZS See Zou ( l99? ) for a more detailed analysis of a similar condition in a single-agent context.
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3.3. Opli~nal Incenlive Mechunism under Caoperative Otivnership
Now we turn to solving the problem of the cooperative. The derivation is
quite similar to that under the absentee ownership except for a different
objective function and an extra budget-balancing constraint.
PROPOS[TION 2. Under A 1, l{lere e.rlslS an opitmal . SOliliion Io P". Denote
lhis solution hy (Sa(x. B), ea(B)). It satisfzes ea(B) - e~`(B) and
S"(x, 6) - S~"(B) f[x - x(e~`(~))], ( 17)
tit~here ( S~`(B ), e~`( ~)) satisfies that for all B E 6 and i E N,
xe;(e~`(B)) - iié(e~"(B) B') - 0, b'i E N, B E 6, ( 18)
S~"(8) - a~"(B') -F V'(e~r(y), 6`) ( 19)
e~.~~:(e:) -- f (~ y-o(e~,(é), ó~) dF-~(ó-~) dé~ t a~, vt E N. (?o),J g. ,I H-.
a`~O,iEN, (21)
a~2d
f [.r(e~`(B)) - ~ S~`;(A)] dF(B) - 0 (~,)
e ;
ProuJ:See the Appendix.
Equations ( 18 ), ( l9 ), and ( 20 ) are the conditions parallel to the character-
izations ( 14 ), (15 ), and ( 16 ), respectively. It is clear by comparing ( 18 ) with
( I 1) that the solution to P' attains a hrst-best effort allocation. In some sense
this result is an extension of d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet ( 1979 ) who
analyze extensively the same problem w~ith multiple agents in a public good
context. Under proper conditions, d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet show
that efficient allocation can be achieved despite the presence ofhidden infor-
mation the agents possess. Our model is more general in that the agents now
not only possess private information, but also make private effort. As men-
tioned earlier, a residual nonowner's role to help relax the budget-balancing
condition into an expected one is indispensible for our solution in the pres-
ent context.
In this solution we note that each agent's expected utility now consists of
two parts [see ( 20)]. The first part, -fe; fA-; L'B(e~"(B), 9')dF-'(é-')dB`, is
similar in form to that in the solution to P" [see ( 16 ) ]. We keep calling this
amount the agent's private information rents. This amount is the minimum
that is required to guarantee that agent i will report truthfully his type and
choose the first-best effort. Apart from that, a` is the share ofthe extra pro6ts
left unused for the incentive purposes. We have assumed ( see A l ) that the
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first-best expected output is sufficiently higher than the joint costs of al] the
agents. This assumption can now be made more specific as to require that
the extra earnings are higher than the sum of the expected information rents
to all the agents. This allows a` to be positive for all i E N( see the proof in the
Appendix ).
The difference in the power of incentives ín the optimal sharing rules
under the two ownership structures can be seen by comparing ( 13 ) with
(17 ). Using ( 14 ), the slope D` ofthe incentive contract in ( l 3) lies between 0
and l. The higher D` is, the higher is the incentive power ofthe contract. The
first-best allocation can only be established when D' - 1 for all 0' E 6` and i
E 1~', which is achieved in the cooperative's solution.
But what is the intuition behind this first-best solution? Perhaps the easiest
way is to look at the derived cooperative's objective function ( 8). The objec-
tive of maximizing the equality weighted sum of all the members' utilities
aligns the individuals' interests with that of the órm as a whole. Since the
agents' utilities take the form of information rents, in our cooperative what is
supposed to be maximized is exactly the sum of all the agents' information
rents, possibly plus a share of the residuals, i.e., a`. Further, from ( 16) and
(?0 ) each agent i's utility ~r' can be seen as a functional of the effort recom-
mendation function e'( .). Since G'~,,, ~ 0, ~' increases in c~`. this implies that
if higher effort were to be recommended for a given report D, the agents'
utilities or information rents must also increase correspondingly in order to
induce truthful report of information. The optimal upper bound for e'( .) is
the first-best effort function e ~'( .). In the absentee's case, when e' exceeds ~~'.
the principal's expected utility diminishes because the total marginal infor-
mation rents start to outweigh the marginal output, whence the second-best
effort levels c:~'. Whereas, in the cooperative's case, provided that the po-
tential profits are high enough, information rents can be optimized by set-
ting e~` - ef.
It is worth remarking that none of the agents or no subgroup ofthe agents
should be able to claim an amount more than s a' on top of their maximum
information rents. Otherwise some other agents necessarily receíve lower
information rents and the first-best solution would not be feasible any more.
This is why in characterizing the optimal solutions to the cooperative's prob-
lem we have specified as a necessary condition that all the constant amount
a' are nonnegative. Note, however, that we have assumed that none of the
agents is despensible for the cooperative's production. Since in our solution
all the members of the cooperative receives a higher e~cpected utility level
than their reserved utility, no member can credibly threaten to break away in
order to claim a higher share of profits. Therefore what we have identi6ed is a
reasonable class of feasib(e optimal mechanisms that achieve first-best effi-
ciency, although other less efficient, and probably less reasonable, mecha-
nisms may also exist. In those organizations where the members uphold
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certain distributional rules as an utmost criterion, e.g., egalitarianism, and
efficiency is only of secondary concern, the optimal incentive mechanism
prescribed in ( l 8)-( 22 ) would no longer be suitable.
Admittedly, this first-best allocation in the cooperative is derived under a
rather particular assumption that optimal joint output substantially exceeds
joint costs. If this were not the case, a second-best solution would also result
for the cooperative. Nevertheless, from the above analysis, it is intuitive that
even if the cooperative cannot achieve a first-best contracting solution in
cases where assumption A 1 does not hold, the optimal arrangement under
the cooperative ownership would still be superior to that under absentee
ownership. This is because the agents in the cooperative, by definition hav-
ing all the claims on the expected profits, have always more profits to share
than in the absentee owner's organization, provided that the potential profits
for the firm are positive. These extra claims could be used to increase the
incentives for the agents.-ó
Thc constant terms a' in the cooperative's optimal solution can be settled
quite arbitrarily, provided that they are positive and their sum satisfies the
expected budget-balancing condition (22). For instance, recollect that we
have let the output .r denote the revenue net of the costs of capital. If, say,
each cooperative member must contribute a share of the capital for the
purchase of technology or assets, and this constitutes part of the sharing
rules, then a' may be determined pro rata, according to the shares of the
capital contributions among the agents as an extra return on equity. But if
equality ofincome is given more preference, it is also feasible to set a' - a for
all i irrespective ofthe agents' share ofcapital contributions. Note again that
the amount ~ a` is the extra profits after capital costs and the total informa-
tion rents. This arrangement could be viewed as giving efficiency the first
priority and equality in income the second. In our case, since all the agents
share the capital investment equally, equal sharing of extra profits seems to
be the most plausible solution. In sum, when there is a surplus of expected
proóts net ofcapital and information rents, there are infinitely many ways to
share it.
4. FURTHER DISCUSSION
4.1. The ~ionitoring Is.sue
In rationalizing the existence of the capitalist firms Alchian and Demsetz
( 1972 ) have proposed a hypothesis concerning the principal's role as a moní-
tor. They argue that moral hazard on the part of agents engenders ineffi-
ciency, and thus necessitates supervision. In order to avoid moral hazard on
'6 A more rigorous analysis for this case is being attempted in a subsequent paper.
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the part of the monitor, according to Alchian and Demsetz, it is best to let the
residua] claimant, who is identified with the owner, perform the monitoring
role. This hypothesis has received some sceptism recently. Holmstr~m
( 1982 ) contends that the principal's role is not essentially one of monitoring.
He shows that with a principal enforcing penalties for underproduction of
joint output, judiciously designed contracts alone can completely eliminate
inefficiency caused by team moral hazard. In a fixed-form contracting frame-
work, i.e., where the forms of contracts are not freely chosen but subject to
exogenous constraints, Putterman and Skillman ( 1988 ) further show that
monitoring does not necessarily improve efficiency. The incentive effect of
supervision is shown to be critically dependent on the incentive schemes
employed, the risk preferences of the agents, and the degree of informative-
ness of monitoring.
An immediate corollary of our cooperative's efficiency solution is that
under the cooperative ownership structure monitoring is not necessarily
valuable even with precontractual asymmetric information. This result ex-
tends Holmstrbm's ( 1982 ) observation to the present context involving both
moral hazard and adverse selection. What is more interesting here is that
Alchian and Demsetz's argument appears to become self-fulfilling in our
principal-owner's firm: the separation of ownership and management engen-
ders inefficiency, as we have shown, and this inefficiency may be mitigated if
the principal is able to monitor the agents' individual performances. In other
words, in situations where there is room for monítoring to improve effi-
ciency, the principal's role may bejustified; but the existence ofthe principal
as an exclusive owner may be the very cause that leads to such a situation.
Since monitoring is usually imperfect and costly, our qualitative compara-
tive result would not alter even if the absentee owner engages himself in
active supervision of the agents' effort. Our observation might thus also be
seen as a substantiation of Putterman and Skillman's ( 1988 ) argument that
in comparing the efficiency implications of different ownership structures,
the effect of monitoring should succumb to the firm's incentive structures on
which ownership has a most direct impact.''
4.2. Nloral Ha.ard on the Residtral Claimant
We have argued that the residual revenue claimant does not have to be a
residual control claimant, therefore does not have to be an owner. His func-
tion is more of that ofan insurer who helps the cooperative to implement an
optimal incentive mechanism. The agents and the residual claimant only
need to sign a contract that legalizes the residual claimant's right to receive ~
'-' Putterman and Skillman ( 1988) refer to the profit-sharing arrangement. See their refer-
ences for empirical evidences that proót-sharing enhances efficiency.
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- x-~; .Sa` when ~, 0 and the obligation to pay the amount - J when v ~
0. This residual claimant will not face moral hazard problems. A second look
at the sharing rule (Sa, e~) as defincd in ( 17) reveals that the problem the
residual claimant faces is quite benign from his point of view. Under the
sharing rules (S', ea), the agents can shift the outcome distribution to the
detriment of the residual claimant only by providing more effort than re-
quired, for the expected residual equals ( n - l)[x(e~`) - x(e)]. But the
marginal benefit from providing extra eflórt is a publíc good since it is shared
by all the agents, while the marginal cost is borne individually. Thus no agent
would like to incrcase the effort above the first-best level. It is also clear the
agents do not have any incentive to make less than the first-best effort levels
as well.
Here we find a very special type of residual claimants. Though their in-
come takes the form ofa residual return, it is actually negatively correlated to
the net profits of the firm.28 The theoretical possibility ofsuch type of resid-
ual claimant points to the difficulty of generalizing the residual claimant as
the owner of the firm, since the former does not necessarily have the proper
objective of the owner, i.e., maximizing the firm's expected profits, as we
would expect.
A similar observation can be found in Eswaran and Kotwal ( 1984). They
show that the group-penalty scheme proposed by Holmstrfim ( 1982 ) is sub-
ject to a serious potential moral hazard problem on the part ofthe principal.
Implicit in our modeling, as well as that of Holmstrám, is that the residual
claimant cannot make any covert side contracts with one ofthe agents. If he
could, a side clandestine contract that gives any chosen agent a higher pay-
ment for under production would effectively induce this agent to shirk. This
effect is most serious in Holmstrdm's group-penalty scheme because the
residual claimant receives all the jointly realized output whenever the output
falls short of the optimal one. In our optimal solution, the temptation for the
residual claimant to collude with an agent is less devastating because our
contracts take a linear form rather than a step-function form, but it is still
present. This point is best seen by a comparison between the marginal utility
of the residual claimant and that of any single agent, say agent l, if agent 1
reduces his effort by ,e' . In the equilibrium where all the other agents are
expected to choose their optimal effort levels, agent 1's margínal utility is
approximately zero since he maximizes utility in choosing effort in the equi-
librium. The residual claimant's marginal utilíty would increase by (n -
1).re~ (e~` ) ~e' . This clearly gives room for a collusion between the residual
claimant and the agent.
However, this potential moral hazard problem on the part of the residual
Zg Whether such residual ctaimants exist in the real world is. of course, an empirical issue.
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claimant is not just for the cooperative but may also exist for the absentee
owner's firm, although probably to a lesser degree.29 In the absentee's solu-
tion any single agent's marginal utility in effort remains at zero but the
principal's marginal utility in any agent r~s effort reduction of Ae' is (~ D'( B)
- 1).re~(ë)Ac`. As long as ~ D`(B) - 1 ~ 0, the principal has an incentive to
collude with one ofthe agents. This hazardous temptation vanishes only if S
D' ~ l.
These observations indicate that theoretical contractual arrangements can
be subject to practical limitations, and that much effort is yet to be made in
understanding the firm as a nexus of contracts. At this stage, we could possi-
bly justify our analysis by pointing out that secret side contracts ofthe sort as
discussed above can be easily made illegal by the contracting parties and that
illegal contracts are hard to enforce. Even if a clandestine agreement is im-
plemented there might be a chance for other parties to discover it e.r post.
The sevier penalty ex post, enforced by law, may deter the residual claimant
from conducting this illegal activity.
4.3. Colltision .~Irnong the ,-lgents
Another interesting problem concerns the possible coordínation of strate-
gies among the agents against the residual claimant. Although we have as-
sumed away this type of problem by adopting the noncooperative solution
concepts to characterize the games, the problem is unlikely to be unreal in
practice. Moreover, even if we stick to the present noncooperative frame-
work, there still can be tacit collusion among the agents. This latter type of
the problem is known as the multiple-equilibrium problem and is being dealt
with in a growing literature (e.g., Demski and Sappington. 1984; Demski et
al., 1988; Ma et al., 1988; Palfrey, 1991; Zou, 1991, etc.). It has been recog-
nized that an incentive-compatible mechanism may induce other equilibria
than the one desired by the principal. That is, given an incentive-compatible
mechanism, collective cheating, or deviating from the recommended effort
levels may constitute other equilibria in which all the agents expect higher
utility to the detriment of the principal, or, more generally, to the residual
claimant. Should this type ofcollusion be latent, the residual claimant con-
tracting with a more cooperative team would expect a higher chance to be
deceived and therefore would very likely to demand a higher risk premium
or simply shun financing or insuring a cooperative. This probably is one of
the reasons why cooperatives tend to have more ditFiculties in competing
29 This observation is due to a referee.
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with capitalist firms for external financing or insurance.'o However, it is
worth noting that agents in an absentee-owner's firm have the same incen-
tive to collude, except probably to a lesser degree. In order to understand the
precise impact of possible collusion we must thus have a consistent model for
both types of the firms.
4.4. Risk Preferences
Some commentators on the success and demise of labor-managed firms
(LMFs) maintain that the member-workers' incentive to share income and
employment risk provides a rationale for the formation of the LMFs,
whereas profit sharing among members provides a rationale for the dissolu-
tion of the LMFs (see, e.g., Miyazaki, 1984; and Martin, 1991). These hy-
potheses rely on the assumptions that the workers are risk averse and that the
firm can freely adjust its size of inembership over time. None of these as-
sumptions are present in our model. Instead, the risk-neutral assumption
plays a quite important role in our efficiency solution to the incentive prob-
lem of the cooperative firm." Our result may thus be seen as providing
another rationale for the existence ofthe LMFs which is more closely depen-
dent on the firm's underlying ownership structure, and which does not de-
pend on risk sharing.
However, since the efficiency superiority of the cooperative in our context
is derived from the firm's ability to design efficient profit-sharing rules, our
finding is somehow at variance with the second hypothesis that profit sharing
is detrimental to the survival ofthe LMFs. Intuitively, this hypothesis applies
to a fixed-form contracting framework where only equal profit-sharing rules
are considered and applied to all the members, including the old ones and
the new ones, which provide disincentive for the incumbent members to
absorb new members and dilute their ownership. An unverified conjecture is
that if periodical contracts are allowed to maximize the existing members'
~ See, e.g.. Jones and Svejnar ( 1982 ), Stephen ( 1982 ), Miyazaki ( 1984 ), and Gintis ( 1989 ).
Other proposed reasons include the traditional xenophobia of the capitalist economy towards
the workers' cooperatives ( Horvat, 1982 ), the impossibility of renting intangible assets when the
cooperative is viewed as a pure rental firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1979 ), and the incompatibil-
ity between residual claimancy and the right ofcontrol (Putterman, I982: Williamson. 1984).
The possible hazard of collusion among cooperative members that faces the órm's residual
claimant is more in line with that considered by Putterman ( 1982) and Williamson ( 1984).
" If the agents are risk averse, a first-best solution to the cooperative's problem might still be
derived using other contractual forms in this context, where the production uncertainty centen
only on the endogenous variables, i.e., the agents' types and effort. But when there is also
exogenous random variables that influence the final output, the risk-neutral assumption is more
likely to be necessary for a tirst-best solution (see Zou, 1989; Picard and Rey, 1990; and McAfee
and McMillan. 1991 ).
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utility subject to that the new members break even, they might give the
existing members more opportunities to expand their membership.
5. CONCLUSION
[n this paper we have considered two extreme cases of a firm's ownership
structure: one with complete separation ofownership and management, the
other with complete overlap of ownership and management. We have de-
rived explicitly the optimal ICP mechanisms under the two ownership struc-
tures and shown that the public communication equilibrium derived under
the former structure does not attain the socially most efficient output while it
does under the latter structure. This suggests that the ownership structure of
an organization, even viewed as a comprehensive contract, matters for its
economic efficiency, and that the collective ownership structure with the
operating agents, managers, workers, etc., being the owners of the tirm can
be an efficient form of organization.3'-
This theoretical observation is probably most suitable to explain the wide-
spread practice ofpartnerships among physicians, accountants, consultants,
etc., where the members' financial capacities are more likely to meet the
relatively modest capital requirement. In reality, even a medium-sized órm
can involve huge amounts of capital investment, far exceeding the wealth
capacity of the employees as a whole. Limited liability law will prevent the
agents from issuing riskless debts to finance projects. Moreover, specialized
managers or workers already have a stake of their human resources in their
company. If they are risk averse, it can be prohibitively costly, in terms ofthe
risk premiums, to let them bear all the firm-specific financial risks.
Therefore, our comparative result remains purely a normative hypothesis,
whose relevance or applicability are subject to critical verifications of the
assumptions employed. In a separate article we continue this line ofresearch
to investigate the joint-ownership structure. ~vherein the firm is jointly
owned by outside investors and the employees, the case of Employee Stock
Ownership Plans ( ESOPs), for instance. The welfare implications of differ-
ent ownership distributions for each group will be examined in a more gen-
eral model involving risk aversion and limited liability. It is also tempting to
investigate the efficiency implications of the optimal incentive structure
under collective ownership without external residual claimants. In this case
team moral hazard would cause efficiency losses under cooperative owner-
ship ( Holmstrbm, 1982 ), and we might find interesting trade-offs between
3' The dependence of a firm's efficiency on its organizational structures have also been no-
ticed in different adverse selection contexts, e.g., Miyazaki ( 1977) and Boyd. Prescott, and
Smith (1988 ), though the issue of ownership has not been addressed explicitly. See also Pint
( 1991) and Roemer and Silvestre ( 1989 ).
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internalizing ownership and separating ownership from management. The
analysis in this paper has shown promising signs of a fruitful discussion
about ownership and efficiency using the incentive mechanism approach.
APPENDIX: PROOFS OF PROPOSITION 1 AND PROPOSITION 2
We take two steps to solve the problems P" and Pa. The first step is to
derive the optimal incentive mechanism under the simplified assumption
that the agents' individual effort levels are perfectly observable. The solu-
tions to PP and P' are then derived constructively in step 2.
Step 1. If the effort level ofeach agent is observable, hence enforceable, the
incentive mechanisms need not depend on x because of the deterministic
relationship between .r and e. Thus we only need to consider incentive com-
patible mechanisms in the form of (S(B), e(~)), where e(B) is enforceable,
which satisfy the incentive compatibility condition
def
B` E arg max a'(B`, B`) - EB-,[S`(l~', 9-') - V'(e`(B`, B- `), B')l,
9~
`dB` E 8`, i E N. ( 23 )
The principal-owner's problem is reduced to
PP":
max EB[x(e(B)) - ~ S`(B)],
s.e r
subject to ( 23 ) and ( 3).
And the collective-owners' problem is reduced to
P'A:
(24)
max EB[x(e(B)) - ~ L"'(e'(B), B`)J, (25)
s.e r
subject to ( 23 ). ( 3), and ( 5 ). Note that in ( 25 ) the budget balancing condi-
tion ( 5) has been plugged into the objective function ( 7).
We limit our attention to the differentiable solutions to P'" and P'~.
Given a mechanism [ S(B), e( B) J, the first-order condition implied by ( 23 ) is
~é~(B`, B')~é,~B, - J
[S`B;(B) - Ve(e'(B), B')eé,]dF-'(B-`) - 0
e-~
d9' E 6`, i E N. ( 26 )
a~a unrvc zou
By the Envelope Theorem, this implies"
~r"(B') --f I'o,(ei(fl), Bi) dF-i(B-i), `dDi E 6i, i E N. (?7)
n
Condition ( 26 ) also implies ~ró,q, - f V~eá,dF-i evaluated at Bi - Bi. Thus
A-,
eé,( B) ~ 0 with ( 27 ) is a sufficient condition for ( 23 ) to be satisfied with a
differentiable mechanism ( recall that V~,~ ~ 0).
All the above analysis is suitable for both problems of P"" and P'`'. Now
we concentrate on solving P"a ~
Since condition ( 27) implies that the agents' optimal utility is an increas-
ing function of their type, and the principal's utility is negatively correlated
with S, hence with ~r, the individual rationality constraints can be replaced
by
a'(B') - 0, `di E .N. (28)
In what follows we first neglect the requirement eB.(B) , 0 and solve the
following adverse selection problem:
Pas:
max f [-r(~'(D)) -~[~`(B') f L'`(e'(B), Bi)]]dF(e), (?9)
x,e Ej i
subject to ( 27 ) and ( 28 ). Note that from ( 3), (?9 ) is equivalent to ( 24 ).
Then we check that the solution to PA5 satisfies c~á,(B) , 0 for all i E N and
derive the optimal contract for P"" from ( 3).
LEMMA l. Under A 1-A3, there e~ists u unique optinia! sohrtion to P"s.
Denoteit b1'(~r(B), é(9)) -[(n'(B'), é'(D)), ... ,(ir"(B"), ë"(B))]. Irsuris-
fies(14)and(16).
Proqf. ( i) E.vistence and Uniqueness. Let G( B, ~r, e) - x(e )-~; [~r i t
Y"i(ei, Bi)] and let ki(Bi) -( l- Fi(Bi))~ fi(Bi), and considerthe maximiza-
tion problem
max [G(B, ~r, e) -~ ~~ri f~ kiL'~(ei, Hi}] (30)
e i i
for specific values of B and ~r. Note that ~i ~ri is cancelled out, hence the
solution to the problem should not depend on ~r. We need this construction
for latter use in the proof of sufficiency.
13 A" denotes the derivative with respect to B' viewing a' as a compound function of B'; A;
denotes the partial derivative with respective only to B' explicitly appearing in n' ( not those via
other variables). -['he same rule applies to other variables.
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From A2 and A3, and the fact that x is concave and 6"(e', B') -( 1-
F'( 0' )) ~ f`( B' ) 6'~( e' , B' ) is convex in e for all B E 6 and i E N, the objective
function in ( 30) is concave and continuously differentiable in e on [0, B],
therefore a maximum exists. Further from A 1 the maximum must be at-
tained at a unique interior point of [0, B] for each given B, and satisfies the
first-order condition ( 14). Denote this solution by ~~(B). From the Implicit
Function Theorem, è:6 --~ A" is differentiable on 6 under assumptions
A l-A3 and the twice differentiability of .r. It is then easy to see ihat given
c~(B), ( 27) and ( 28) determine a unique ir(B), which is given by (16).
( ii ) Sií~iciency. Now choose a pair of functions ( a( B), e(B)) different from
( ir ( B), Ë ( B)) which also satisfies conditions ( 27 ) and ( 28 ). We compare the
principal's expected welfare in ( ~r(0), t?(~)) with his expected welfare ín
(~r( 0), e( B)). Denote them by W and t~', respectively:
~ - 1-i~ - l;l;~
- J [~(e, ~, ~') - c(B, ~-, e)ldF(e)y ~
- f [[G(8, ir, é) -t ~ ~' ~ ~ k'I'B(é', B')l~ ; ;
- [G(9, a, e) -I- ~ ~' } ~ ti`I's(e', 9`)l
é r
- ~ ~'~'á(é', 8`) } ~ k`Ié(c'`. B') - ~ (~' - ~`)]dF(B)
r , ~
~ f [~ ~`t'é(e`. B') - ~ k`ti'é(é', B') - ~ (~' - ~')ldF(B).
e ~ r ,
Integrating by parts and using ( 27 ) and ( 28 ) we can derive
f ~ (~ - ~')dF(e) - s ~ ; [~(B') - ~(B')ldF'(e')
e , r e
f [F'(B`) - 1] f [VB(e'(B), B') - VB(é`(B), 9')ldF-`(B-')d(~'
e- e--
- f~[k`~~é( e', B`) - k`Vé( é', B')ldF(B).
e ;
Thus ~ ~ 0. Q.E.D.
For deriving a solution to P"", it remains to check whether the second-
order condítion for the incentive compatibility constraint ( 23 ), i.e., éB; ~ 0,
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is satisfied. Let L-( L' ,..., L") where L` denote the left-hand-side of Eq.
( 14 ). Now differentiating ( 14 ) w.r.t. B for all i E N yields the matrix relation
dL dc dL
de dB } dB - 0~
where
L~~ LQ, ... L~~
dL LP, LQ, ... Lé~
dc - : : ~ - ' ~
L~~ L~z ... L~„ ~
ëe~ ë82 ... ëd„
dë èé~ ëq, ... èy„
dB - - : ' . :




ILó~ 0 ..- 0 ~
0 Ló~ . . . 0
0 .-. Lá~,
(31)
In fact the matrix dL~de is nothing but the second derivative of G as
defined in the proof of Lemma 1 with respect to e. We have shown that G
attains an interior maximum at c~( B) for all the values of B E 6. This implies
that dL~de - GeP is negative definite at ë(B) for all B E 6( see. e.g., Binmore,
1982, Theorems 19.42-43). Consequently, the inverse of matrix [dL~de],
(dL~de]-', is negative definite. By rearranging terms in (31 ) we obtain
dê dL -' dL
dB - - de dB ~ ( 32 )
Clearly, the right-hand-side of ( 32 ) is a positive definite matrix ( Lé, -( k"
- 1)Y'~ f k'V~B ~ 0). Thus the matrix dë~dB must be positive definite. But
this implies that the diagonal entries ofdë~dB, i.e., i~B;, i E.~', are all positive.
Finallv, from the definition of ~' in ( 3) we can derive the optimal contract
for P"``: S(B') - ir(B') f V'(ê`(B), B') [see ( 15)]. To summarize, we state
the result in the following lemma.
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LEt~tt~tA 2. UnderAl-A3, there exists an optimal solution to P"", which is
characteri~ecl by ( l4), ( l6), and ( 15).
We now turn to solving problem P"`.
Le[vttvtA 3. Under A 1, there exists an optima! sole~tion to PL`. Denote this
solution by ( S~`(B), e~`(B)). It satisfies ( 18)-(22).
Proof. ( i) Eristence. By the concavity ofx and the convexity of V', and by
assumption A1, e~"(B), i E N, is uniquely determined from ( 18). Conse-
quently ~~"(B') is given by ( 20) (with suitably chosen a`), and S~"(B`} by
( 19 ). In the statement ofthis proposition, a' should all be nonnegative and
the sum of them ensures the budget-balancing constraint ( 22 ). This is possi-
ble ifand only if the optimal output exceeds the sum ofthe agents' informa-
tion rents. By (19), ( 20), and ( 22), the difference between the optimal
output and the sum of the agents' information rents equals ~; a'. Under
assumption A 1( ii ) we can show that this difference is indeed positive:
- J [.r(e~`(B)) - ~ (S~" - a`)]dF(B)e ;
- f [-r(e~`(B)) - ~ (~rr~`;(Br) .~ Vr(e~,(B) B,) - a`)]~F(B)
e ;
- Je
[~~(e~`(B)) f ~ [ 1 ~.;~8(~~) Vá(c~'(B), B') - V'{e~"(B), B')] 1 dF(B)
~ 0 [by AJl (ii)].
It remains to check now if the constraints in P'" are satisfied. a~"(B')
obviously is nonnegative given that a' , 0, and from the preceding analysis it
has been shown that the incentive compatibility condition ( 23 ) is equivalent
to (?7) plus the second-order condition eB' ~ 0. Equation (27) is obviously
satisfied if we differentiate ~r~"( B' ). We omit the proofof ee" ~ 0 because it is
analogous to the proof of Lemma 2. Thus the existence of ( S~`( B ), e~`( B)) is
proved.
(ii) Si~ciency. Let G(B, e) - x(e) -~; V'(e`, B') be the integrand ofthe
objective functional in P~`. [t is clear that e~`(B) -(e~`'(B), ..., e~`"(B)) is
the solution to problem
max G(B, e)
e
for specific values of B. This implies that for any other function e(B), G(B,
e~`(B)) ~ G(B, e(B)) for all B E 6. Thus
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f G(B, e~(B))dF-` , f G(B, e(B))dF-'.
e o
Q.E.D.
Step 2. Now we resume the assumption that the agents' individual effort
levels are not observable. Since the remaining proofs of Proposition 1 and
Proposition 2 are quite similar, we only complete the proof of Proposition 1.
Given (S', eP) as is defined in ( l3 ), let ~`(B', e`, 8') be the expected utility
of agent i reporting B' and choosing effort e' when the other agents play the
ICP equilibrium strategies. Let ir'(B`, e', B) denote the ith agent's utility
whose type is B' and who has announced 0', after the stage ofcommunication
when the other agents have announced B-' and are expected to follow the
mediator's recommended effort levels. ~`(B`, e`, B) writes as
ir`(B`, e`. B) - S'(B', B-')
f D'(B`, B-`)(.r(e`, c~-`(B'. B-')) --~"(c'(B'. B-'))] - ~~(e', 0`)
and a'(B`, e', B') writes as
a'(B', e', B') - J ir'(9`, e', B)dF-'. (33)~-~
We first verify that in (So, eP) agent i will always choose the recommended
effort level irrespective of his report, i.e., e' - è`(B', B-`). The first and sec-
ond-order conditions for e` to maximize ( 33 ) are
Té,(B', e', B) - D'((3', B-')le; - Ié(e`, B`) - 0. (3~4)
forallB'E6',BEe,andiEN,and
~r'e,e, - D`xe.e: - V éP , 0 ( 35 )
for all B` E 6`, B E 6, and i E N. Equation ( 3~l ) is obviously satisfied for e` -
é`(B', B-')) given the construction of D', and ( 35 ) is always satisfied. This is
sufficient to guarantee that the recommended effort will be chosen.
When all the agents choose the recommended effort levels, ( SP, ep ) practi-
cally reduces to (S, é). From Lemma 2(S, é) induces all the agents to report
truthfully. Thus (S', eo) achieves an ICP equilibrium [See ( l) and (2)].
When all the agents play the equilibrium strategies, their individual rational-
ity constraints are clearly satisfied, and the principal obtains the expected
utility as though the agents' effort could be enforced. This implies that ( SP,
eP) is optimal to Po. Q.E.D
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